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To understand how our brain evolved and what it is for, we are in urgent need of
knowledge about the cognitive skills of a large variety of animal species and individ-
uals, and their relationships to rapidly disappearing social and ecological conditions.
But how do we obtain this knowledge? Studying cognition in the wild is a challenge.
Field researchers (and their study subjects) face many factors that can easily interfere
with their variables of interest. Although field studies of cognition present unique
challenges, they are still invaluable for understanding the evolutionary drivers of cog-
nition. In this review, I discuss the advantages and urgency of field-based studies on
animal cognition and introduce a novel observational approach for field research that
is guided by three questions: (a) what do animals fail to find?, (b) what do they not do?,
and (c) what do they only do when certain conditions are met? My goal is to provide
guidance to future field researchers examining primate cognition.
K E YWORD S
animal cognition, brain evolution, chimpanzees, field-based studies, foraging behavior, fruit,
observational approach, rainforest
1 | THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
Comparison is fundamental in understanding the evolution of cogni-
tion (Box 1). Over the past decades, scientists from the fields of
anthropology, psychology, and biology have employed the compara-
tive (phylogenetic) method to gain insights into the evolution of the
animal mind1–4 and to identify cognitive traits that are unique to
humans and those that are shared with other animals. This work has
focused on a variety of topics, ranging from comparisons of primate
skulls2,4,5 with that of gene-regulatory networks driving the earliest
stages of cortical development.6 Additional research on the evolution
of cognitive traits is conducted by inferring cognitive abilities from
observed behaviors across species.7,8 By linking differences in cogni-
tive abilities with differences in current socio-ecological circum-
stances, hypotheses about the evolutionary pressures that
contributed to the positive selection of these abilities can be tested
and this can provide answers to the question of why the traits
evolved.3,4,9 Drawing inference about cognitive abilities from behavior
is, however, not straightforward. Behavioral scientists have therefore
developed two approaches: the experimental approach and the obser-
vational approach.
2 | HOW TO STUDY ANIMAL COGNITION?
The first approach to infer cognitive mechanisms from behavior, often
seen as the “gold standard” in cognitive science, is the experimental
approach. Shettleworth states, “It is almost never possible to tell with-
out experimental analysis what kinds of processes are reflected in a
given behavior”8 (p. 5). In lab or field-based experiments, scientists
manipulate predictor variables that are thought to influence the ani-
mal's behavior. For example, by placing an animal into a new environ-
ment and minimizing the number of landmarks it is familiar with, we
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can test the animal's ability to make novel shortcuts between newly
learned food locations. This helps us to infer what type of mental rep-
resentation of space the animal made.10 The second approach is to
observe behavior in a natural environment without manipulation
(hereafter: an observational approach). In this particular example, we
would wait until an animal disperses into novel areas to know whether
it can find novel shortcuts or not. Clearly, experiments can make
research more time-efficient and at the same time make it easier to
distinguish between cause and effect. By comparing manipulated with
unmanipulated control conditions, we can infer that it was only the
manipulated variable that affected the animal's response and not any
other variable that happened to change simultaneously with the vari-
able of interest. This is particularly important when such variables are
naturally associated with each other. For example, if we play back an
alarm call and the targeted monkey reacts, we can infer that it is only
the sound that it reacted to and not the smell or the body language of
the animal that emitted the call.11 In other words, when multiple sen-
sory stimuli are always experienced simultaneously by the receiver in
a natural situation, an experiment is the only way to infer what infor-
mation the receiver acts on.
Clearly, we have to assume that causal relations are present,12
yet it is important to keep in mind that causality can never be
proven, whatever approach we take.12,13 Experiments simply make
it more likely that a change in one variable leads to a change in
another variable, ceteris paribus (other things being equal). Since
other things rarely are equal, a balanced experimental design is
required. The difference between experimental and control condi-
tions, such as the vegetation density during a playback of an
alarm call in a tropical forest,11 may not always be easy to mea-
sure. To better account for such a confounding variables (e.g., a
vegetation type that facilitates a predator's attack), we should bal-
ance the order and number of control and experimental trials. In
addition, we should randomize the assignment of individuals to
trials, to account for a difference between individuals. However,
this can be difficult in most field and zoo experiments, where
individuals cannot be separated from the group. In addition, differ-
ences between experimental and control trials are less likely to be
balanced out when the number of trials one can conduct is limited
due to habituation effects or a small number of available subjects.
Differences between experimental and observational approaches
are not always as clear as is generally assumed. All experiments
require observation, and experiments may not control all possible con-
founding variables. In these cases, experimental studies can, by a
posteriori means, statistically control some confounding factors, such
as motivation, that could not be controlled by the experimental
design.14–17 Similarly, observational studies can, by a priori or a
posteriori means, control confounding variables, which increases the
likelihood of finding a cause and effect relationships
substantially.18–20 In fact, some experimental scientists describe
experiments and nonexperimental observational studies as not cate-
gorically distinct methods, but rather place them at two ends of a con-
tinuum of planned versus post hoc control for variation of predictor
variables (see21 for further details).
In addition to being part of a continuum, both approaches are
inseparable. The list of experimental studies in cognitive science that
were initially inspired by observational studies on foraging, predator
avoidance, and social behavior, is extensive.14,22–28 Yet, more impor-
tantly, experiments have little value without previous field-based
observational work. To make sense of an animal's reaction to a manip-
ulation, we first need to know how it reacts to naturally occurring var-
iation in that same variable. Furthermore, knowledge about failures in
experimental design29 (e.g., due to distortions in broadcast speaker
sound) only become apparent once we know that the reaction to the
manipulated variable is different from the animal's reaction to natu-
rally occurring variation in that same variable. Similarly, experiments
preceded by observational recordings of the subjects' behavior can
help to explain cognitive performance. Such combined approaches
can, for example, help researchers avoid selecting individuals that
were recently involved in a social conflict before joining a cooperative
experimental task.30
BOX 1 : Cognition
Cognition, defined as the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store, and act on information from the environment,8 can
result in declarative knowledge (knowing that) and procedural knowledge (knowing what to do8). For example, when an animal is
searching for food, it could have knowledge about the exact locations of, and directions between, the food and a small hill, or it could
simply only know that if it wants to find food, it needs to turn right when it reaches the small hill. Knowing what an animal knows and
what cognitive mechanisms it uses is not simply derived from observing what an animal does. Hence, behavioral science has developed
experimental and observational approaches to infer cognition from behavior. Different types of cognition can lead to a variety of
knowledge that can help an animal to find, access, and guard food and mates. For example, to find food, animals may use foraging
cognition,33 that is, mechanisms that acquire, process, store, and act upon (a) sensory information about the cues emitted by
foods,69,91,119,183 (b) spatial information of the locations and efficient route of travel,18,155,184 (c) temporal information of the timing of
a visit, or return,58,176,184 (d) ecological information of the characteristics of food sources and competitors (e.g., level of ephemerality,
synchrony, fruit production, and depletion rates19,70,71,74,186,187), and (e) social information about the decisions or knowledge of group
members.33,188,189 All these information types can either result in declarative or procedural knowledge. A cognitive scientist's challenge
is to find out by looking at the outside what type of knowledge is emerging on the inside.
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3 | WHERE TO STUDY COGNITION?
It is not always considered ethically justifiable to manipulate wild and
protected animals. Therefore, many experiments that focus on highly
endangered and protected animals, such as great apes, take place in
laboratories or zoos, where experimental manipulation does not dis-
tract from or delay animals from finding natural foods or detecting
predators.8 However, that is often not the first argument brought for-
ward to support this choice of research location. When discussing the
pros and cons of field-based versus captive-based studies in primatol-
ogy, Tomasello & Call31 wrote that “Other methodological challenges
for field approaches to primate cognition emanate from the impossi-
bility of controlling all relevant factors under ‘wild’ conditions.”
For example, if we refer back to the observation of the animal that
dispersed to a new area, we will never know whether the animal's
ability to make new shortcuts in the novel area resulted from it using
its own cognitive abilities, or by it simply following the new group
members it encountered.32 This leads us to the question of where one
can best study animal cognition.33,34 Debates on what is the best
environment to do so have been numerous.23,37,38 In some fields of
science, these debates led to the realization that a collaboration
between lab and field-based science, also termed the synthetic
approach, is essential for improving scientific insights.9,39–42
In the field of primate cognition, which is most prominent in investi-
gations on the origins of human cognition, the debates seem to have led
to an alienation of each other's work. In fact, field-based and captive-
based primatologists rarely read or cite each other's work33–36 (Box 2).
This situation is unfortunate, because it is especially the comparison of
natural habitat and captive studies can inform us about evolution.40,41
A classic selection study in the field of evolutionary biology provides
perhaps the best example of a comparative field-based and lab-based
study that led to new insights. In this study, a set of lab experiments found
that guppies (Poecilia reticulata) derived from high predation localities had
delayed senescence in comparison to counterparts from low predation
localities, while the field experiments showed the opposite effect.39 It was
because of this difference in results, evolutionary biologists came to
understand that high predation risk leads to a reduction in immune system
investment, which has a different effect on the onset of senescence in a
parasite-free lab environment than in the field.39 This insight was only
obtained by studying the same species in the lab as well as in the wild.
Similar insights could be obtained in the field of primate cognition.
For example, studies on tool use can reach contrasting conclusions
when the behavior of captive and wild animals from the same species is
compared. For example, bonobos (Pan paniscus), who (so far) have not
been observed to use tools in the wild to obtain food, were observed to
use tools in captivity.43 This difference in behavior helps us to obtain
insight into the potential variables that play a role in the use of cognitive
abilities needed to perform complex forms of tool use. Variables so far
identified are: (a) time available for exploration of objects, (b) frequency
of access to objects, and (c) levels of distraction (by predation risk or a
BOX 2 The Imbalanced Distribution and Diffusion of Knowledge in Primate Cognition
A recent study investigated how knowledge derived from research in either captive or natural environments is represented in the literature on
primate cognition, and to what degree captive and field approaches for data collection are used in these two types of studies.190 For this study,
Glabischnig190 selected 16 review and theoretical papers focusing on primate cognition and the types of studies (field vs. captive) that were cited
by the respective authors were counted (Tables S1 and S2).
Distribution of study types across all cited publications
Glabischnig190 found 583 (66.55%) references to studies conducted on primates in captive environments and 293 (33.45%) references
to studies in natural environments (Tables S1 and S2). These figures suggest a highly unbalanced availability or distribution of knowledge
on primate cognition from natural versus captive environments. Captive-based studies largely applied experimental techniques and only
15% used purely observational methods in their research. In contrast, studies in natural environments mainly applied observational
methods and used experimental techniques in 28% of cases (rates include studies that incorporated both experiment and observation
[Table S1]).
Captive-based studies were cited at a higher rate than field-based studies by captive-oriented primatologists (317 captive vs. 48 natural
studies cited). Citations of their field-based colleagues showed a more equal distribution (266 captive vs. 240 natural studies cited). This was
also reflected by the average ratio of captive-based/field-based studies for captive-oriented (8.27) and field-oriented primatologists (1.28;
Table S2). In addition, there is a notable difference in the kind of field-based studies that were referenced by the two different types of
researchers. While field-oriented researchers cited experimental studies in the wild more than 30% of cases, their captive-oriented col-
leagues cited the same type of study about 8% of the time (percentages include also studies that include field experiments as well as a com-
bination of experimental and observation studies [Table S3]).
There was one outlier among the publications from field-oriented primatologists with a high lab/field ratio (ratio: 4.59; Table S2).
Interestingly, this publication is a collaborative paper between field-oriented and captive-oriented researchers. The collaboration seems
to have resulted in a lower ratio of lab/field studies than the average ratio for captive-oriented primatologists, as well as a much higher
absolute count of field study citations than any paper from captive-oriented primatologists (Table S2).
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need to search for food44,45). Acknowledging these variables and linking
them to ecological variables, such as food availability, provides useful
guidelines when designing statistical models that investigate why some
natural populations of primates use tools in some habitats, but not in
other habitats.46–48
Unfortunately, the number of cognitive abilities that have been
studied in the same primate species, both in the field and the lab, can
often be counted on two hands. For example, regarding studies that
investigated whether chimpanzees are able to plan for the future,
defined as acting for a future motivational state,22 I counted seven
studies from captivity (observational49,50: 2; experimental51–55: 5),
and only one from the wild (observational: 1,19 experimental: 0). For
episodic-like memory, defined as an ability to recall “what.” “where,”
and “when” events occurred,56 I counted only two captive-based
studies14,57 (observational: 0, experimental: 2) and none in wild chim-
panzees. The only study of episodic-like memory in wild primates was
done on capuchin monkeys using an experimental approach.58
To encourage future comparisons and collaborations between cap-
tive and field-based primatologists, I here apply the expression
“unknown, unloved”. As a field-based observational scientist, in this
paper, I explain the advantages of the observational field-based
approach through examples of my own work. By doing so, I will describe
some of the advantages of field-based science as well as the challenges
faced in captive-based science. Yet my aim is not to devalue captive-
based nor experimental research, or to pit us against each other. Rather,
my aim is to make captive-based and experimental scientists think criti-
cally about the challenges of their approach and hopefully become more
open to, or familiar with, the potential and advantages of observational
fieldwork (Box 2). The ultimate aim of this paper is to achieve a better
appreciation of the value and urgency of observational field-based sci-
ence and to encourage collaboration among scientists using different
approaches—enabling us to benefit from our distinct expertise.
4 | THE IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY OF
FIELD STUDIES
4.1 | Obtaining insight into evolutionary function
Two sources of information are required to study the origin and evo-
lutionary function of a cognitive ability. First, one needs knowledge of
how species' cognitive abilities compare. This information has been
gathered in a plethora of studies in comparative psychol-
ogy.3,8,9,24,34,59,60 Here, field-based and captive-based scientists can
reach similar conclusions.8,61,62 Second, one needs knowledge on the
socio-ecological context in which species use particular cognitive abili-
ties, to subsequently compare the existence of such contexts across
species. Then, both types of knowledge can be used in phylogenetic
analyses to test hypotheses about which evolutionary pressures con-
tributed to the positive selection of a cognitive ability.3,4,7,60 Hence, it
is not sufficient to only compare which animals use particular cogni-
tive skills, but it is also of the utmost importance to compare the con-
ditions in which these animals employ these skills.
Shettleworth8 defined cognition as the mechanisms by which ani-
mals acquire, process, store, and act on information from the environ-
ment, making the understanding of an animal's environment and its
interaction with it crucial for understanding its cognition. This envi-
ronment can be created and controlled in a lab or zoo, though the
field allows for understanding how different mechanisms and environ-
mental factors interact and integrate,8 and in what contexts cognitive
mechanisms are employed and can lead to evolutionary benefits.
4.2 | External validity
One other advantage of field-based science is that it provides external
validity, meaning that it enables us to test whether cognitive abilities
identified in captive settings are used by the animals under natural
conditions.41,42 Such validity not only increases our confidence that
mechanisms were successfully identified,41,42 but it also helps us to
understand why animals in captive setting sometimes perform poorly
in cognitive tasks. One classic example of experiments that lack exter-
nal validity and result in surprisingly poor cognitive performances can
be found in the field of spatial cognition (discussed in 63). In a variety
of delayed-matching-to-sample tasks, primates need to remember the
spatially distributed objects or food dispensers from which they
received food and which they did not. Single locations can be remem-
bered very well when the intervals between exposure and memory
testing (retention interval) are as short as 2 min.64 However, larger
numbers of locations appeared to pose a problem. Initial findings
suggested that monkeys are only able to remember a very small num-
ber of spatial locations for short time durations.63–66 Some of these
studies led to the conclusion that remembering large numbers may be
a unique trait in apes67 or that memory skills are better in particular
species of lemurs compared with others.68 In many of these experi-
ments, food locations were not stable, the primates only had one
exposure and the retention intervals were often very short and did
not match with variables impacting foraging decisions in the
wild.63,65,67,68 In the wild, visits to novel food sources such as newly
emerged fruit are usually separated by 1 day to 1 week.62,69,70 Fur-
thermore, only a few food sources have not been visited
before.62,69,70 For example, in chimpanzees, the average number of
fruit trees fed in per day that was “new” within our long consecutive
follows of 28–44 days was only four,71 and across years our follows
suggested that many locations had already been learned in previous
years.69 When Menzel and Junco72,73 tested Andean saddleback tam-
arins (Saguinus fuscicollis illigeri, which is now referred to as
Leontocebus illligeri), the researchers were the first to use learning
schedules that were similar to those likely used in the wild. They intro-
duced novel food locations one at a time with 24 hours between each
novel presentation and the testing phase. This approach resulted in
(a) one-trial learning, (b) a memory of up to 30 locations, and (c) food
locations being remembered for up to 77 days.72,73 These results
strongly contrasted to earlier findings that lacked external validity.66
Matching the value of other variables that impact foraging decisions
in the wild, such as social variables, that is, allowing primates to forage
in a social group, likely improved memory performances as well. The
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emission of food calls, in such social groups are likely associated with
positive emotions,17,74 which potentially contributed to the consolida-
tion of memory traces. Overall these considerations of natural forag-
ing behavior contributed to the exceptional performances of the
tamarins tested72,73 and may explain differences in performance in
other species.75,76
4.3 | Motivation and challenging complexity
Rosati and colleagues25 compared the cognitive performance of chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes) and humans (Homo sapiens) by offering them
a choice between a small immediate reward and a large delayed
reward.25 Humans surprisingly chose a larger reward, with a delay of
2 min, only 20% of the time that a choice was offered, while chimpan-
zees did so 70% of the time.25 We know, however, that humans are
able to delay gratification and can wait for larger rewards, and for
example invest money to gain profits years later. Indeed, when the
researchers conducted an additional study, and changed the reward
to offer money instead of food, humans were more often willing to
wait for a larger reward than for a smaller immediate reward. The
study is a perfect illustration of how important motivation is when
testing cognitive abilities. Currently, a growing number of studies sug-
gest that a lack of evidence for cognitive skills could have been a
result of a lack of motivation or interest by the study subject.77–79 For
example, studies that took into account bond strength in subject
dyads, before subjects were set up to participate in a cooperative task,
appear to be more likely to find evidence for cooperative abilities
compared with those studies that paired subjects up ran-
domly.15,30,80,81 Cognitive tasks with human demonstrators were
completed more successfully by enculturated or human-oriented apes,
which had more contact with (and perhaps more control over) human
actions, compared with zoo-housed apes.35,77,79,82 Similarly, chimpan-
zees who watched a chimpanzee demonstrator performed better in
imitation tasks than chimpanzees who watched a human demonstra-
tor.26,79 Scientists who conducted the study suggested that the chim-
panzees might lack the motivation to imitate another species.79
Cognitive experiments that involved researchers dressed up as their
study subject's species and behaving like them suggested that the
subjects were motivated to look at what the (dressed up) researchers
were doing and what they had “in mind”.27 This study by Krupenye
and colleagues27 was the first in decades to find strong evidence that
nonhuman apes have a theory of mind.
Other studies indicated how important it is to challenge study
subjects and to provide many options when trying to test for cognitive
skills.83,84 When Schubiger et al.84 provided common marmosets
(Callithrix jacchus) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) with the
option to indicate where food was hidden in a two-choice task, for
which the chance of success is 50%, both species performed dramati-
cally worse than when they were challenged to remember one loca-
tion out of nine.84 Similarly, when Girndt et al.83 found that when
apes were offered a choice between pulling two prepositioned rakes
to obtain food, where one of the rakes would push the food into a
trap, they failed to choose the correct rake above chance.83 However,
when they were challenged to use only one rake where they had to
choose to move the rake to either side (the side with the trap or the
side without) to eventually pull the food toward them, 80% of the
apes made the correct choice in the first trial. In short, these studies
show how complexity in study design can drastically alter results and
how more complex or challenging tasks can trigger animals to perform
better.
One clear advantage of testing cognitive skills of animals in their
natural habitat compared with those in captive settings is that wild
animals need to be motivated and interested to perform cognitive
skills to obtain naturally occurring food and mates. This does not
mean that animals in the wild are always more motivated to employ a
cognitive skill than animals in captivity. For example, the motivation of
wild animals to participate in field experiments is described as being
lower than in captive animals that are likely to have fewer distractions,
predetermined foraging plans, or fear of novel objects or food.21,28 In
addition, there are observational field studies that suggest that moti-
vation (e.g., to walk straight and fast toward sleeping or feeding sites)
was low at particular times and areas.85,86 Furthermore, not all cogni-
tive skills may necessarily lead to increased access to food or mates.
Yet motivation to employ cognitive skills to obtain food (which is the
most common reward for cognitive tasks in captivity) is likely to be
overall lower in captive than in wild animals for the simple reason that
wild animals are not provisioned. Motivation in wild animals may be
particularly high in food-scarce periods, when foragers experience
periods in which they catabolize major amounts of body fat, lack par-
ticular nutritional compounds, and need to decrease group size.87–89
4.4 | Lots of space: Body movement, experience, and
cognitive development
The natural environment is characterized by its information complex-
ity and a relatively large-scale distribution of food and mates. For
example, when an animal locates food, it receives sensory information
about odor, the sound of other foragers, and visual aspects of food
sources. When it has a memory of the food location and value, this
knowledge needs to be integrated with sometimes conflicting sensory
information.90,91 Exposure to a variety of information sources may
lead to particular ontogenetic changes in the nervous system.92 For
example, enabling the development of particular types of mental
maps.10 In cognitive science, there is a growing consensus that sen-
sory changes produced by motor actions are critical for both develop-
ment and maintenance of cognitive capacities.93 Animals that are
never exposed to a large variety of information and that lack the abil-
ity for large scale self-movement to integrate environmental cues may
show relatively lower performance levels than animals that have those
opportunities.10 This effect can be observed in captive-bred golden
lion tamarins (Leontopithecus rosalia) that showed low spatial perfor-
mance when they were released in a large-scale space94 compared
with related tamarin species in the wild.95,96
While group sizes in a captive environment increasingly approach
natural values, group sizes are still lower than those observed in natu-
ral habitats in many captive settings.108 In addition, the total number
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of individuals that captive animals have had opportunities to learn
from in a life time are relatively low, due to lower rates of dispersion,
migration and births. Therefore, animals in the wild have the potential
to learn social and ecological skills from a potentially larger number of
individuals.97–99 Individuals do not need to rely on a small number of
group members that share their enclosure, especially when these
other individuals may all not possess the cognitive capacity at stake.
Hence, one of the advantages of working with wild animals is that
cognitive abilities have likely developed to their full extent, due to a
particularly high variety of social and sensory input and large-scale
movement abilities.
Moreover, wild animals are less likely to endure uncontrollable
stress that is known to result in aberrant behaviors and signs of
depression in many captive animals.100–104 Enrichment conditions
have improved substantially over the years, and most experiments are
conducted on a voluntary basis. Yet animals that are most often sub-
ject to cognitive tests, such as primates, cetaceans, corvids, and ele-
phants are all long-lived animals,105–108 and a history of
uncontrollable stress, including social and nutritional stress and unnat-
ural rearing conditions (e.g., not being reared by the mother) can have
long-term effects on brain morphology.109,110 The increased number
of studies conducted with sanctuary animals, especially on social cog-
nition is particularly worrisome,111 as these animals have likely
endured high levels of social and nutritional stress before reaching
these sanctuaries112 (but see 101). For example, social deprivation dur-
ing infancy is known to have negative effects on the development of
social skills and cognition,113 resulting in shorter play bouts that lead
to more aggression in chimpanzee orphans compared with mother-
reared chimpanzees.114
4.5 | Urgency
Lastly, it must be emphasized that field studies are urgent. We can
study animals in the laboratory or zoo for the next 100 years, but we
cannot say the same for many animals in the wild. Natural habitat,
especially of tropical forest primates, is disappearing at rapid
speed.115–117 This rapid decline of the rainforest environment and the
primate populations that are dependent on it creates a high level of
urgency to study animals in their natural habitat.
When collecting behavioral data on wild animals, advanced tech-
nologies that enable camera trap or audio triangulation methods are
increasingly applied.99,118–120 Such technological advances enable us
to study behavior (through observations or experiments) in a highly
noninvasive manner and to avoid the risks associated with habitua-
tion, such as disease transmission.121 Such approaches make it possi-
ble to study wild animals without the need for long-term commitment
to protecting the habituated animals from poachers. It is, however,
the long-term commitments for studying wild populations that stan-
ches their rapid decline, as sheer researcher presence significantly
decreases poaching and logging activities in the study areas.122 Field
primatologists have a tradition of studying a diverse array of primate
species21,108 including many populations within these species.123,124
The number of species and populations clearly outnumber those in
captivity,108 creating an inspiring potential for comparative research
that is disappearing in front of our eyes.115–117
Having summarized the advantages of field-based studies, the
question still remains whether it is actually possible to study cognitive
abilities in the wild and how we can control for confounding variables,
especially when we work with highly endangered animals for which
experiments are rarely possible. Tomasello & Call31 were not the only
ones to express concern about the difficulties of studying animals in
the wild. For example, Pritchard et al.28 wrote: “As nearly all of this
control is difficult if not impossible to achieve in the experimental
study of animals cognition in the wild, this can be a major downside to
attempting to investigate animal cognition in the wild”. In addition,
MacDonald & Ritvo120 wrote: “More importantly, obtaining sufficient
control over extraneous variables is often impossible.” In the following
sections, I describe the approaches I used to deal with many of these
proposed difficulties. In addition, I provide guidelines (Figure 1) for
future data collection designs.
5 | FIVE STEPS TO INVESTIGATE
COGNITIVE ABILITIES IN WILD ANIMALS BY
OBSERVATION
In his seminal work on the aims and methods of ethology, Tinber-
gen125 expresses his concern about the unequal ratio of experimental
and observational studies, describing contempt for simple observation
as “a lethal trait in any science”. In the same paper, he writes “our sci-
ence will always need naturalists and observers as well as experi-
menters; we must, by a balanced development of our science, make
sure that we attract the greatest possible variety of talent, and cer-
tainly not discourage the man with a gift for observation”. It is, there-
fore, striking that an updated guideline for observational fieldwork to
study animal cognition is lacking to date, despite the many guidelines
that are provided for experimental fieldwork.9,28,29,31,41,42 Responding
to this, as well as to Tinbergen's plea for a more balanced approach
(Box 2), I will focus on describing five steps that combine novel and
traditional methods.
5.1 | Step 1: Choosing a study species
The first step in starting an observational field study on animal cogni-
tion is to choose the study species. The choice obviously firstly
depends on one's questions. However, practical guidelines can be pro-
vided (see also Martin & Bateson126). Two important criteria proposed
by Pritchard et al.28 are that the species should be “reliable” and
“observable”. Chimpanzees fit these criteria exceptionally well. First,
most primates show high levels of site fidelity and can, therefore, be
easily relocated across field seasons.32 Second, chimpanzees are
observable, meaning they do not fly away, dive underwater or live
underground but can relatively easily be observed throughout the
day. Furthermore, individual chimpanzees, as in most primate species,
can be identified without being marked. Another important criterion
when choosing a study species or population is that sufficient existing
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knowledge is available about the behavior and the socio-ecological
environment of the selected animals. The latter is essential for the
identification of crucial situations (Step 2) and the exclusion of alter-
native variables (Step 3).
5.2 | Step 2: Identifying crucial situations
To identify crucial situations in which animals would likely employ
particular cognitive skills, we can make use of the decades of
field research on a large variety of species that reveal insights into
the challenges animals face in comparison to others in their natural
habitat.127 For example, previous research shows that chimpanzees
have a relatively costly form of long-distance terrestrial locomotion
compared with quadrupedal monkeys,128,129 and are morphologically
and/or physiologically limited in their digestion abilities.127 They can-
not eat highly toxic seeds (e.g., Anthonota fragans) or mature leaves, as
can other primates such as sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys 18) and
many Colobinae.106 Yet their large body and brain rely on energy-rich
tropical forest food, such as large crops of ripe fruit.129,130 Taï chim-
panzees spend 85% of their feeding time on ripe fruit,74 and even in
fruit scarce periods, females still continue to eat ripe fruit 67% of their
time.131 Yet ripe fruits are rare; in some chimpanzee territories, ripe
fruit-bearing tree density of edible species was estimated to be
17 times lower than that of trees that bear unripe fruits.127 Large ripe
fruit crops that can “host” an average chimpanzee party are even rarer
and can have a complex distribution in space and time.127 To deal
with this challenge, we can hypothesize that wild chimpanzees create
a mental representation of food locations and values in time, through
a large variety of cognitive mechanisms, such as a memory of distant
past events, flexible planning and keeping track of proportions of
fruit-bearing trees within species, that is, intuitive statistics.127 Hence,
by investigating the behavior of chimpanzees during their daily search
for ripe fruit we can expect to be able to identify the use of a number
of cognitive skills. I provide a detailed example of one more specific
foraging situation below.
Identifying situations in which animals likely employ certain
behaviors in their natural habitat is nothing new and has a long tradi-
tion in the field of ethology.8,38 Many studies that revealed that ani-
mals use cognitive abilities resulted from considerations of the
benefits of using them in the natural habitat.56,132 Making a priori pre-
dictions about the particular information and skills animals in the wild
“should” use is, however, not always straightforward and requires
extensive knowledge of their behavior as well as the characteristics of
their socio-ecological environment. For example, rufous humming-
birds (Selasphorus rufus) choose flowers in the “correct” spatial loca-
tion (where they previously found food) over flowers of the “correct”
A POSTERIORI DESIGN:
A PRIORI DESIGN:
An Observational Approach to Study Cognition in the Wild
Step 2: Identifying Crucial Situations  
• Determine when animals will likely benefit from, and thus employ
cognitive skills
Step 5: Statistical Control 
• Combine recorded data with long-term contextual data
• Apply hierarchical modelling techniques
Step 4: Enlarging detection probability of the ability of interest
• Record a suite of behaviors that can exhibit the same cognitive skill
• Record non-events (conduct quasi-experiments)
• Record variables that allow for testing of conditional decision-making
(interactive effects)
Step 3: Identifying alternative explanations and Observational control
• Record variables or behaviors that can exclude alternative explanations  
( e.g., record informative failing)
Step 1: Selecting study species 
• Choose a reliable, observable and well-studied species
F IGURE 1 Diagram illustrating the different
steps that can be taken to study animal
cognition in the wild using an observational
approach
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color (at which they previously found food).28,133 Considering that
hummingbird-pollinated flowers have evolved in response to hum-
mingbird foraging, it could be expected that they would pay more
attention to color.28 However, if one considers that flowers become
depleted or differ in the amount of food they produce, a prediction
that the birds remember the location of the flowers instead of only
the color may better match observational findings.28 Dependent on
the situation (e.g., the spatial scale), animals should prioritize knowl-
edge based on memory over particular forms of sensory information,
or the other way around.28,92,134
5.2.1 | A detailed example: Flexible planning-
returning to fruit trees at the right time
To identify a situation in which chimpanzees might use flexible route
planning, I made use of the following ecological and behavioral informa-
tion. Rainforests are typically characterized by a large biomass of fruit-
consuming foragers that compete for fruit and can easily deplete a large,
productive, ripe fruit-bearing tree after it has been fed in by a chimpan-
zee.135 Sympatric monkeys, though seldom ripe fruit specialists, do eat
ripe fruit and can easily deplete the few ripe fruits that are in a tree
when chimpanzees are foraging elsewhere, especially when these fruits
are eaten by many other foragers. Figs (Ficus spp.), for example, are
eaten by more animal species than any other plant genus.136 When we
visited chimpanzee feeding trees, we found that sympatric species of
monkeys, hornbills and squirrels were more likely to be found foraging
in a fig tree than in chimpanzee feeding trees of other fruits species.19
Small fruits are also a sought-after resource. They can be eaten by
a large number of bird species, for example, because they are simply
easier to swallow and can be eaten at faster rates when processing
surfaces (e.g., teeth) are small.137,138 Long-term phenology data of
chimpanzee feeding trees (11 years) further indicated that ripe fig
fruits and small fruits are less persistent.19 These fruits are more
ephemeral and stay in the trees for shorter periods than other fruits.
The combination of this ecological and behavioral information hel-
ped to identify a situation in which it could be beneficial to plan a
return to fruit trees and to arrive earlier than competitors at these
types of fruits. First, the significant differences in ephemerality level
of chimpanzee food sources created a situation in which some of the
first food they eat in the morning (hereafter: breakfast food) would be
more quickly depleted than others. Second, the variation in distances
between chimpanzee sleeping and breakfast sites created a situation
in which arrival times would be later at sites that are further away,
and would thus likely result in ending travel at a depleted tree if one
would not plan to depart earlier to reach such trees. Hence, the com-
bination led to the prediction that chimpanzees would benefit from
flexibly planning their early morning departure times (see Step 4;
“Question 3: Under what particular conditions do chimpanzees plan?”
for a description of how this was tested).
In a similar way, variation among food production rates of individ-
ual trees71,127,139 creates a situation in which it could pay to be able
to differentiate between individual food trees and to remember feed-
ing experiences across seasons or years. This discriminative ability
would then enable foragers to not approach just any tree at the start
of a season but instead to approach particularly those that are likely
to bear large amounts of fruits. Hence, I chose the situation where
food production rates varied substantially, to investigate whether or
not chimpanzees use a memory of distant past events (see Table 1 for
more examples of other cognitive abilities).
5.3 | Step 3: Excluding as many alternative
explanations as possible
There are many variables that can explain a behavior. The cognitive
mechanism of interest to a researcher is only one of them.8 For exam-
ple, an animal that travels in a straight line toward a food source may
have navigated by using a mental representation of the food (using a
particular mental map), but it could at the same time have used sen-
sory cues, such as the fruit's conspicuous color, or a searching rule
(“go straight until you bump into a food source”). These possibilities
challenge cognitive scientists who want to infer the use of a particular
cognitive ability by observing behavior.
Hence, to test for particular cognitive abilities, it helps to think of
many alternative explanations, ideally before the start of data collec-
tion. While determining alternative explanations, we are greatly aided
by the growing number of studies on animal behavior in the wild and
historical knowledge from long-term field sites about individuals and
their socio-ecological environment.21,127,140,141 This development
results in a growing biological knowledge that can and should be used
TABLE 1 Example situations in which one can expect an animal
to employ several cognitive mechanisms




When the proportion of food-bearing
trees differs substantially between
species
What where and when
memory
When there are differences in ripening
or degradation rates of food
Euclidean map use When having entered areas, where




When being young and needing to
learn how to reach food by using a
tool
Social cognition




When having seen a predator and
others, who are related to you, have
not
Theory of mind When wanting to get food that others
want as well
Social learning When having migrated to a new group
and need to know who has the
highest rank
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in data collection designs. For example, when designing a statistical
model to test for planning abilities by predicting nest departure time, I
could make use of a total of 46 field studies ranging from 1960 to
2013 to understand which variables should be included to predict pri-
mate sleeping site departure time. In addition, advances in data collec-
tion technologies such as high resolution, long-term bio-logging142–144
camera trapping,98,119,145 satellite and aerial imaging,146 and long-term
field sites21,140,141,147 that have decades of contextual data to draw
from, provide the data that can help to rule out alternative explana-
tions through statistical methods (Step 5).
Another way to rule out alternative explanations is through obser-
vational control. This control is achieved by quantifying the informa-
tion animals could use, such as the sensory cues that food or mates
emit (see an example below). We can also pose the question, what do
animals fail to do? (see Question 1 below). These lines of complemen-
tary scientific progress allow us to reason more wisely about the vari-
ables that most likely affect an animal's behavior.
5.3.1 | An example—Are primates using sensory cues
or memory?
One of the most difficult challenges facing field-based scientists who
investigate spatio-temporal memory or route planning is to rule out
the use of sensory cues as an alternative explanation for observed
behavior. For example, some plant species that rely on seed dispersal
can substantially increase the amount of scent emitted from ripe fruit,
such that primates can distinguish them more easily from unripe
fruits,148 and likely detect them from larger distances. One of the
most frequently used methods in primatology to rule out the use of
sensory cues is to estimate the distances at which the study species
can perceive food or other animals.36,69,85,118,149 Being primates our-
selves sometimes helps to make these distances more realistic. On an
olfactory level, humans, similar to nonhuman primates are sensitive to
isoamyl acetate, the major component in a large variety of fruit
odours.71,150,151 Although, the exact link between olfactory receptor
genes and odorous ligands is still unclear, humans also have a compa-
rable and even slightly larger estimated number of functional olfactory
receptor genes than other primates.152 On a visual level, comparative
studies indicate that visual acuity thresholds are lower for human than
for nonhuman primates, as humans have typically larger eyes and
hence larger retinal image size.153,154 This enables us to assume that if
humans cannot see something, neither can most other diurnal pri-
mates. Of course, the human observer's senses may be adapted to dif-
ferent light levels and may not be as trained as those of the study
subjects, yet detection distance estimations could make certain simu-
lated detection distances (e.g., >100 m) highly unlikely, leaving the use
of spatial memory as the most likely explanation.155
Perhaps a better option to rule out the use of sensory cues as an alter-
native explanation is to incorporate certain behavioral processes, such as
feeding competition, to one's predictions. An example of such an approach
is the study of Tujague & Janson,36 who investigated the approach speed
of tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus nigritus) toward food trees. They
ingeniously predicted that the number of individuals that can benefit from
early arrival at food trees would increase initially with fruit amount, but
would eventually plateau or even decline as food availability becomes
large enough to allow all group members to feed. Their data supported
the idea that the monkeys were considering the amount of fruit as well as
the level of competition they would face at the feeding tree. The tested
effect made it highly unlikely that the monkeys had simply been guided by
sensory cues, as this would have predicted a linear effect of fruit amount
on speed, as opposed to the nonlinear relationship they found.
The easiest observational way to rule out search strategies that
are guided by sensory cues is to investigate only approach behavior
toward foraging goals that do not emit a strong smell or have a con-
spicuous color, such as water holes,144,156 or to focus on food species
or types that do not emit any smell or visual cue that indicates edibil-
ity.18,36 Another option is to investigate what animals fail to find
because food sources are depleted or did not yet produce food. Ask-
ing this question can be particularly informative when investigating
cognitive mechanisms that can help animals to find food or mates.
5.3.2 | Question 1: What do chimpanzees fail to
find?—Informative failing
To test whether chimpanzees employ intuitive statistics to improve for-
aging efficiency, our team followed five female chimpanzees in the Taï
National Park in Cote d'Ivoire, totaling 275 days in three food-scarce
periods (Figure 2). During these periods we, marked all trees that the
chimpanzees fed in or inspected and recorded their location with a GPS.
To know the history of tree visits and to be able to detect the beginning
of fruit-feeding periods, we decided to prioritize on the duration of our
follows instead of the number of individuals we followed.71 The expecta-
tion was that the chimpanzees would use intuitive statistics to more
often inspect highly synchronous fruit species, for which they had a high
success rate of finding fruits. Hence, we predicted that their inspection
behavior would be guided by botanical knowledge. Importantly, we
focused on inspections of empty trees. These trees did not bear any
F IGURE 2 The author collecting data on chimpanzee behavior
using a voice recorder and GPS [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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fruits, nor did they have fruits on the ground, and they could not emit
any sensory cues like color or smell, or cues emitted by foraging animals
that could have triggered the chimpanzees to look up. By recording
when the female chimpanzees looked up at the crown and failed to find
food, we gained insight into their expectations about finding food. Since
fruits, and thus sensory cues, were absent, we argued that their behavior
must have been guided by their botanical knowledge, and was thus able
to exclude relevant explanatory variables, such as the use of smell or
vision, by observational control. In other words, by recording failing
behavior, it was possible to determine what chimpanzees were likely
expecting—making their failures become informative (informative failing).
Since the number of inspected trees that were empty was substantial
(38% of all inspected trees), we could analyze what influenced the prob-
ability of inspecting empty trees. In addition, we measured fruiting syn-
chrony levels of the different fruit species from 11 years of phenology
data. To rule out the alternative explanation that the chimpanzees were
simply conditioned and were more likely to inspect trees that belonged
to species at which they fed earlier more often, we included fruit-bearing
tree density as a control in our statistical model. This also enabled us to
control for the possibility that the chimpanzees were sensitive to the
absolute number of fruit-bearing trees they had encountered, regardless
of their proportion. Controlling for this, we found that it was the syn-
chrony level and thus the proportion of trees that bore fruits that had a
significant effect on inspection probability of empty trees.71 Hence by
recording informative failing behavior, we found evidence that chimpan-
zees used intuitive statistics; that is, they had expectations about the dif-
ferent success rates of food finding of particular species, irrespective of
their density. This ability to distinguish between proportions of food
items was later tested and confirmed in an independent study in captive
chimpanzees,157,158 providing an example of how field-based and
captive-based studies on the same species can complement each other
and strengthen the evidence for an animal's cognitive ability.
5.4 | Step 4: Increasing detection probability of the
cognitive abilities of interest
In the same way that behavior can be an expression of many different
mechanisms; a cognitive mechanism can express itself through many dif-
ferent behaviors. For example, primates may exhibit their use of a spatio-
temporal memory of a food source by (a) rapid travel,18,159 (b) highly linear
travel,86,160 (c) making significant changes in travel direction,69,161,162
(d) changing travel direction at long distances before arrival,74 or
(e) revisiting after particular intervals.58,163 Although such behavioral diver-
sity may appear overwhelming at first, it can also be an advantage that
can help fieldworkers gain insight into the decision-making of the animal
and detect the use of certain cognitive abilities by applying the rules of
parsimony. Before data collection, it can help to design a protocol that
considers a suite of behaviors known to potentially express the cognitive
skill of interest. Such a protocol should also record behaviors that indicate
what animals do not do, or only do when certain conditions are met. To
explain this in more detail, I show two examples from my studies on
chimpanzees.
5.4.1 | Question 2: What do chimpanzees not do?—
Quasi-experiments
To find out whether chimpanzees employed an across-seasons or
year-long memory of the fruiting states of individual trees, I investi-
gated the probability that chimpanzees would inspect individual trees
that they had fed in during previous years. To control for confounding
variables, such as sensory cues, I not only investigated what chimpan-
zees did, but also what they did not do (when they did not inspect,
i.e., the nonevents21). In an experimental approach, it is as important
to know when the animal reacts as well as when it does not react and
to record the nonevents.21 Similar to an experiment, I sampled the
context prior to the observations in the “testing” phase and investi-
gated whether the context was decisive of whether the study subjects
did or did not react (event vs. nonevent). Yet, contrary to traditional
experiments, I did not manipulate but rather conducted a so-called
quasi-experiment. This is defined by Janson21 as a realm of focused
observations taken under conditions that account for variation in one
or a few hypothesized causal variables, without any actual manipula-
tion of those variables. Thus, I used data from unique follows of one
adult female during the three subsequent years. In the first year, our
team followed and marked all the feeding trees visited by the target
female during 28 consecutive days. During the second and third years,
we followed the same female for eight continuous weeks, which
included the same period as the first year to ensure that we would
cover the same fruiting seasons. Then I analyzed the female's ranging
routes in 2011 in relation to the locations of the feeding trees
between 2009 and 2010. Next, I investigated which variables
influenced the probability that the chimpanzee female inspected one
of these trees on the first approach within the respective fruiting sea-
son. I recorded when the female inspected but also when she did not
inspect (the nonevent) all the trees that she approached to within the
detection distance but did not feed on (i.e., trees that were unlikely to
bear edible fruit).
By recording events as well as nonevents, we were able to calculate
the inspection probability of trees that were approached the year(s)
after. We found that after controlling for confounding variables, both
the number of feeding visits (familiarity) in the previous years and the
maximum amount of fruits found in the feeding trees in previous years
had an effect on inspection probability.69 Therefore, we were able to
find evidence that this chimpanzee used an across-seasons memory
when deciding which fruit trees to monitor by recording what the study
animal did, but by also recording what she did not do. These findings
support experimental studies in captivity, which showed that chimpan-
zees can remember tool locations for at least three years.59 In this case,
the fieldwork provided ideas about the adaptive value of such a memory
of distant past events, as fruit-bearing trees have fruiting intervals that
range from 1 to 16 years.69,127
The initial idea for a quasi-experimental approach was developed
during a study on spatial memory in mangabeys (Lophocebus
ugandae).18,21 To determine whether this species uses spatial memory
of feeding trees' fruiting states, we presampled the context by tra-
versing a monkey group's home range. We then selected a large
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number of fruit-bearing and empty trees from the same species prior
to following the monkeys. It was only after this presampling that we
recorded which trees the monkeys did and did not visit. As my team
followed the group for continuous periods of up to 100 days, we were
able to compare the visiting probability of fruit trees that had been
depleted by the mangabey group earlier in the observation period
with the visiting probability of trees that did not bear fruit yet. Since
both tree crowns and fruit fall areas were empty, sensory cues could
not explain why depleted trees were avoided, and the best explana-
tion of the observed results was that the monkeys were indeed using
a spatial memory of fruiting states.18 Both studies on foraging cogni-
tion in chimpanzees and mangabeys indicated that recordings of non-
events are equally informative as recording what animals do. A similar
approach is widely used in the fields of ecology (resource selection164)
and epidemiology referred to as case–control studies.165
5.4.2 | Question 3: Under what particular conditions
do chimpanzees plan?
To further increase the probability of detecting the use of cognitive
abilities by wild chimpanzees, I continued to test what chimpanzees
do only when certain conditions are met. I was inspired by Noser &
Byrne,85 who found evidence that chacma baboons (Papio ursinus)
departed their sleeping cliffs earlier in fig season than in periods when
they fed on other less sought-after food. Combining this knowledge
with the finding of significant differences in ephemerality levels of
chimpanzee food, I investigated whether chimpanzees plan to leave
their sleeping nest earlier to feed on highly sought-after ephemeral
fruits than when they feed on other fruits. I predicted that nest depar-
ture times would be influenced by a number of variables, including the
ephemerality level of the fruits (fruit size and type), the fruit genus
(figs or other fruits), and a large number of control variables suggested
from earlier studies that affect primate sleeping site departure time.19
We found that the chimpanzees departed earlier to feed on figs, but
only when the fig trees were far away.19 Since arrival time for distant
figs was similar to arrival time at nearby figs, we concluded that chim-
panzees left their sleeping nest earlier to feed on figs that were far
away, to make up for travel time and to arrive at about the same time
as when the fig trees were close to their feeding trees. Perhaps more
intriguing was the finding that the females sometimes departed as
much as 2 hours later when they fed on other kinds of fruits. We con-
cluded that chimpanzees delayed their departure when there was lit-
tle competition with other species, such as for Panda oleosa nuts that
can only be opened by chimpanzees through tool use. In this case,
female chimpanzees (all with young and vulnerable offspring) reversed
their behavior relative to moving toward fig trees, avoiding early-
morning departures when they could not easily reach food by climbing
short distances through the canopy but had to travel long distances
along the forest floor where leopards are active.19
Alternative explanations for a given behavior can always be
brought forward a posteriori. For example, one could argue that the
chimpanzees that happened to depart early could eat from the fig
tree, while the ones that happen to depart later missed out on the figs,
and hence had to feed on other foods. To discard such explanations, it
is crucial to decide a priori to record a suite of behaviors that can indi-
cate planning behavior. For example, the above explanation can be
made highly unlikely if one considers (a) the distances the chimpan-
zees traveled, (b) their speed of approach, (c) the skittish behavior of
the early risers treading along the forest floor in the dark, and (d) the
finding that no fig trees were inspected nor entered before feeding on
the other fruits (see 19) for a discussion of other alternative explana-
tions). First, having recorded the distances and arrival times, we found
that the females arrived at about the same time at the breakfast figs
that were far away and those that were nearby, making it unlikely that
late departures simply resulted in females missing out on figs and end-
ing up eating another kind of fruits. Second, travel speed data
informed us that chimpanzees traveled to fig trees more quickly than
toward other breakfast sites, supporting that they planned their trips.
Third, the observed skittish behavior of the early risers makes it highly
unlikely that females would “happen” to depart early for no reason.
Finally, if the chimpanzees simply missed out on finding figs after late
departures, we should have observed that they inspected or entered
depleted trees before feeding, which was not the case. Arguably, each
of the above behaviors could potentially be explained by yet another
set of alternative explanations; however, following the rule of parsi-
mony, we concluded that flexible planning is the simplest explanation
for this combination of behaviors.
It was especially important to think of potential interactive effects
when understanding the chimpanzees' decision-making and the roles
of competition and predation risk. In this case, we tested for an inter-
active effect between fruit type and distance from the nest to the
feeding tree and tested what chimpanzees do (e.g., depart early for
figs) when certain conditions (e.g., a long distance) are met. Studies
that investigate the interactive effects of ecological variables on ani-
mal behavior can infer complex cognitive abilities. Other examples can
be found in the tool use context. Wild chimpanzees were observed to
be more likely to select heavy tools to crack nuts, yet only when they
would crack nuts on the ground, but not when they had to take the
tool up into a tree to crack nuts on a branch.20 Similarly, the same
chimpanzees were more likely to select heavy tools, but not when the
tools were far away from the anvil and had to be transported over
long distances.20
The more dimensions an animal needs to take into account, the
more likely those particular combinations have never been encoun-
tered before and will therefore be novel, especially when competition
frequently changes these conditions. Chimpanzees reuse the same
tools.166 Hence tools are likely to be found at different locations each
time a chimpanzee revisits the same cracking site. The same level of
complex thinking applies to chimpanzee decisions to depart earlier to
feed in a distant fig tree compared with those that are nearby. It is
true that we do not know where the chimpanzees had been before
we started observing them and thus the early departure for distant
figs could have resulted from the chimpanzees having learned associa-
tions between the time of day and the distance to certain fig trees
and a low or high availability of figs (time–place associations8). How-
ever, we do know that fig trees get depleted after 1.9 feeding visits
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on average and that Taï chimpanzees make their nest at different
locations 98% of the time. Hence, the opportunity for conditional
prior learning is limited, making the use of flexible route planning and
conditional decision-making a more plausible explanation of the
observed behavior.19 Similar novel situations are likely to occur in
conditional decision-making in the social realm, such as whom to mate
with, groom or be social with, as ranks and group compositions con-
tinuously change.167
Not knowing what the animals have done before observations
take place can make it difficult to exclude associative learning expla-
nations in field studies, yet it is important to bear in mind that the
same problem applies to captive-based studies where we rarely know
what animals have experienced before their arrival in the zoo or labo-
ratory.168 Perhaps one could argue that the higher probability of prior
associative learning in wild animals will lead to more false positives
(type I errors) in field-based compared with captive-based studies.
However, cases where cognitive abilities in captivity were only con-
firmed after many experimental studies,27 suggest that captive studies
are more prone to false negatives (type II errors). This further stresses
the importance of studying the same mechanisms in captivity as well
as in the wild.
5.5 | Step 5: Controlling by statistical design—
Controlling the uncontrollable
Finally, we can use advanced statistical methods to investigate the
cognitive abilities of wild animals. The latest developments in the field
of hierarchical or generalized linear mixed modeling169–172 enable us
to use repeated observations conducted on the same individuals. This
makes it unnecessary to average or aggregate months of data col-
lected on one individual to one single data point, which has dramatic
consequences for sample size, power, and statistical analyses. The
ability to use repeated observations of the same individuals has
become especially valuable for scientists who investigate an animal's
long-term memory by obtaining a complete picture of the animal's
experience over time and by observing one individual for extensive
periods. These studies only allow a limited number of study subjects
within the duration of most scientific funding periods.
For example, in 2004, my colleague and I collected 18 months of
data on seven to eight individual male and female mangabeys, respec-
tively. To analyze the data, we were not able to do much more than
simple Mann–Whitney U tests.173 Statistical tests that are appropriate
for small data sets make it impossible to take more than two predictor
variables into account.174 Mixed or hierarchical modeling techniques
such as generalized linear mixed modeling169,170 (SI; Fig. S1) enable
behavioral scientists to use more data, and thus to include many cate-
gorical as well as quantitative predictor variables (to be tested or con-
trolled for) and their interactive effects to predict behaviors.169,170
Hence, these techniques enable us to draw much stronger conclusions
using purely observational data on animal behavior than was possible
in the past.
We furthermore no longer need to throw away data that were
recorded close in space or time to avoid a spatio-temporal depen-
dency of data points. While the approaches are still under develop-
ment, there are several ways in which scientists can account for
autocorrelation between data points taken at short intervals of time
or space,71,171 allowing researchers to use most or all of their original
data. In short, we can embrace all or most of our data and use it to
control for many if not all relevant factors. These statistical models, in
addition, provide large flexibility with regard to the response variables
with diverse distributions (Table 2169) and also with regard to unbal-
anced data collection.
5.5.1 | An example controlling for evening travel
distance to test for future planning
Since chimpanzees make their sleeping nests at different locations in
the forest, I could investigate whether chimpanzees position their nest
closer or more en route to ephemeral fruits. The difference between
evening arrival direction and morning departure direction from chim-
panzee nests can be influenced by many variables. For example, when
figs are rare, a small difference in degree may be caused by the fact
that the chimpanzees were traveling toward the fig tree in the eve-
ning, but were unable to reach it before dusk, because the fig tree
was far away. This could have resulted in chimpanzees making a nest
on the way to the morning feeding tree without the use of future
planning skills. Therefore, controlling overall travel distances between
the last evening and early morning breakfast locations and the possi-
bility that the nest positioning simply reflected a failed attempt to
reach a late night feeding site was crucial. By use of statistical control
we found that chimpanzees made their nest more en route to fig trees
used in the morning as opposed to other morning feeding sites, which
provided strong evidence that they were indeed planning for the next
day.19
TABLE 2 Examples of generalized linear (mixed) models that can
be best applied to different types of observational data
Response type Model type
Normal (e.g., departure time) Gaussian
Binary (e.g., approach or no
approach)
Logistic
Count (e.g., number of visits) Poisson or negative binomial
Count with many zero's (e.g.,
number of visits when visits are
rare)
Zero inflated Poisson or
negative binomial
Count with upper and lower bound
(e.g., number of trials correct out
of fixed number of trials)
Logistic (only after translating
into proportions by use of R)
Continuous with upper and lower
bound (e.g., angle deviation)
Beta
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6 | CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Being selective in the data we record is something field scientists have
been trained to do for decades.125,175 The information one could
record while studying an animal in its natural habitat is often so over-
whelming that choices need to be made about the variables to record
to best answer the research questions. During this process, priority is
often given to behaviors that the target animal performs, such as the
trees it visits, how long it eats, how many other animals are present,
or whom it grooms. Recording when it does not perform certain
behaviors (e.g., when it does not approach or inspect a tree, pick up a
tool or groom an individual, or when it fails to find food or mates)
does usually not have obvious value. Furthermore, such recordings
can require a time investment; one needs to first sample the context
(e.g., mark all the trees with and without fruit in the home range), and
this will take away time from the behavioral observations one can do
within a limited study duration. By providing examples of studies in
which such investments paid off, I hope to have created an under-
standing that this extra time spent can be worthwhile for future
studies.
I hope that such future studies will include collaborations between
field-based and captive-based scientists. Specifically, where similar
questions will be asked for the same species in the laboratory and in
the field. I envision a variety of joint goals.
First, captive-based studies can provide insights into the role of
genetic predispositions in the development of capacities, such as
episodic-like memory, by being able to confront the animals with chal-
lenges they have never faced in the wild (e.g., presenting ice lollies14),
while field studies can enable us to investigate the evolutionary value
of that same mechanism and enlighten us on the type of predisposi-
tions we can expect.18,58,176
Second, collaboration can help us to better understand the extent
of cognitive plasticity. For this, it is essential to study the capacities of
populations that live in different environmental conditions.177–179 The
field offers a wide range of variability.48,180 Hence, comparative stud-
ies on cognitive performances of wild and captive animals provide a
wealth of opportunities to determine which factors are important for
the development of particular cognitive skills.
Third, collaboration can improve the rigor of field science and to
study animals in conditions where experiments are not feasible. To
return to an earlier example of alarm calls, determining whether a
monkey reacts to a call or to another sensory signal, such as a caller's
body movement, is a challenge when you are unable to do experi-
ments. Having more knowledge on the detection distances of these
signals could enable field scientists to exclude visual cues and could
enable us to extend the research to species and locations where
experiments are not feasible. Studies on such sensory abilities, espe-
cially on olfactory detection fields, are surprisingly limited to date (but
see 150,151,153,154,181,182) and would greatly strengthen the conclu-
sions field-based science can draw.
Fourth, field scientists can provide ideas for new captive-based test-
ing contexts, or a way to control for biases in performances. For exam-
ple, many cooperation studies involve food-sharing activities,80,81 which
likely results in an unintended bias for high cooperative performance
scores in food-sharing species. Having detailed knowledge on the
behavior of wild animals provides an opportunity to control for levels of
food-sharing behavior in a comparative phylogenetic analysis, as well as
ideas for new contexts in which to test for cooperative abilities in cap-
tive animals.
Finally, there is a new interdisciplinary field emerging to study the
adaptiveness of cognitive abilities.9 Cognition clearly is essential for a
wide range of behaviors that are needed for survival and reproduc-
tion.8,9 This raises the question of why there is individual variation
and plasticity in cognitive performance. Experiments in the lab suggest
that some cognitive traits are heritable, yet only a few studies so far
have dared to address the question of the consequences of lower
levels of cognitive performance and how cognitive abilities or perfor-
mances are linked to life-history traits or fitness.9 This challenging
question can clearly only be answered by combining our best possible
collaborative skills.
I envision collaborations where scientists using both the
approaches better familiarize themselves with the values of each
other's work. In particular, I hope that improved field-based
approaches produce results that obtain a higher status than is some-
times assigned by captive-based researchers. I especially hope that
the guidelines provided here will trigger young scholars to go to the
field and reset the balance between field-based and captive-based
studies (Box 2). By identifying crucial contexts, collecting data on a
suite of behaviors (e.g., recording what animals do not do, or only
do when certain conditions are met), controlling interfering vari-
ables by conducting observational control (e.g., recording what ani-
mals fail to find), and by combining this technique with well-
thought-out statistical models, based on decades of biological
knowledge, we are able to infer conclusions about the cognitive
abilities of wild animals. What is important to always remember is
that every approach has benefits and challenges. Consequently,
using complementary approaches is more likely to yield novel
insights in primate cognition and move the field in exciting new
directions. Perhaps then, we can even make the “impossible”
possible.
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